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Stochastic utility theorem
Abstract
This paper analyzes individual decision making. It is assumed that an individual does not have a
preference relation on the set of lotteries. Instead, the primitive of choice is a choice probability that
captures the likelihood of one lottery being chosen over the other. Choice probabilities have a stochastic
utility representation if they can be written as a nondecreasing function of the difference in expected
utilities of the lotteries. Choice probabilities admit a stochastic utility representation if and only if they
are complete, strongly transitive, continuous, independent of common consequences and
interchangeable. Axioms of stochastic utility are consistent with systematic violations of betweenness
and a common ratio effect but not with a common consequence effect. Special cases of stochastic utility
include the Fechner model of random errors, Luce choice model and a tremble model of Harless and
Camerer (1994).
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Stochastic Utility Theorem 
I. Introduction 
Experimental studies of repeated decision making under risk demonstrate that 
individual choices are often contradictory. For example, Camerer (1989) reports that 31.6% 
of subjects reversed their choices when presented with the same binary choice problem for 
the second time. Starmer and Sugden (1989) find that 26.5% of all choices are reversed on 
the second repetition of a decision problem. Hey and Orme (1994) report an inconsistency 
rate of 25% even when individuals are allowed to declare indifference. Wu (1994) finds 
that 5% to 45% of choice decisions are reversed (depending on a lottery pair) when decision 
problem is repeated. Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) report a median switching rate of 20.8% 
Although experimental data convincingly show that choice under risk is generally 
stochastic, this finding remains largely ignored in the theoretical work (e.g. Loomes and 
Sugden, 1998). The majority of decision theories assume that individuals are born with a 
unique preference relation on the set of risky lotteries, which typically does not allow for a 
possibility of stochastic choice (unless individuals happen to be exactly indifferent). As a 
notable exception, Machina (1985) and Chew et al. (1991) develop a model of stochastic 
choice as a result of deliberate randomization by individuals with quasi-concave 
preferences. However, Hey and Carbone (1995) find that randomness in the observed 
choices generally cannot be attributed to conscious randomization.  
Deterministic decision theories derive representation of unique preference relation 
and predict that repeated choice is always consistent (except for decision problems where 
an individual is exactly indifferent). Strictly speaking, all deterministic theories are falsified 
by experimental data. However, a common approach is to embed a deterministic decision 
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theory into a model of stochastic choice and fit this compound structure to empirical data. 
Three models of stochastic choice have been suggested in the literature. 
The simplest model is a tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994). Individuals 
have a unique preference relation on the set of risky lotteries but they do not choose 
according to their preferences all the time. With probability 0>p  a tremble occurs and 
individuals choose an alternative which is not their preferred option. With probability p−1  
individuals act in accordance with their preferences. Carbone (1997) and Loomes et al. 
(2002) find that this constant error model fails to explain the experimental data and it is 
essentially “inadequate as a general theory of stochastic choice”. 
The Fechner model of random errors was originally proposed by Fechner (1860). 
Individuals possess a unique preference relation on the set of risky lotteries Λ  but they 
reveal their preferences with a random error as a result of carelessness, slips, insufficient 
motivation etc. (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994). Preference relation is assumed to have utility 
representation R→Λ:U  so that it is possible to evaluate a relative advantage 
( ) ( )21 LULUd −=  of a lottery 1L  over another lottery 2L . If there were no random errors, 
an individual would choose lottery 1L  whenever 0>d . Since actual choices are affected 
by mistakes, an individual chooses lottery 1L  if 0>+εd , where ε  is a random error.  
In a classical Fechner model, random error ε  is drawn from a normal distribution 
with zero mean and constant standard deviation (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994). Hey (1995) and 
Buschena and Zilberman (2000) assume that error term is heteroscedastic i.e. the standard 
deviation of ε  is higher in certain decision problems, for example, when lotteries have 
many possible outcomes. Blavatskyy (2007) develops a model where random error ε  is 
drawn from a truncated normal distribution.  
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Finally, the third model of stochastic choice is a random utility model. Individuals 
are endowed with several preference relations over the set of risky lotteries and a 
probability measure over those preference relations. When faced with a decision problem, 
individuals first draw a preference relation and then choose an alternative which they prefer 
according to the selected preference relation (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1995). 
This paper uses alternative framework for analyzing individual decision making. 
Since repeated decisions are often inconsistent, a natural interpretation of this fact is that 
individuals do not have a unique preference relation on the set of risky lotteries. It is 
assumed that individuals possess choice probabilities that capture the likelihood of one 
lottery being chosen over another lottery. These choice probabilities serve as primitives of 
choice and they admit stochastic utility representation if they satisfy five intuitive axioms. 
A preference relation can be easily translated into choice probabilities. Thus, there is no 
need for a stochastic choice model as a mediator between a deterministic preference 
relation and an empirical stochastic choice pattern. A related axiomatization of choice 
probabilities for riskless alternatives is given in Debreu (1958) and for risky lotteries—in 
Fishburn (1978). In particular, Fishburn (1978) represents choice probabilities by an 
increasing function of the ratio of incremental expected utility advantages of two lotteries.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces an 
alternative framework, where primitives of choice are choice probabilities rather than a 
deterministic preference relation. Section III presents five intuitively appealing properties 
(axioms) of individual choice probabilities. Section IV contains the main result of the 
paper—a representation theorem (stochastic utility theorem) for choice probabilities and 
discusses its main implications and possible extensions. Section V concludes. 
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II. Framework 
Let { }nxxX ,...,1=  denote a finite set of all possible outcomes (consequences). 
Outcomes are not necessarily monetary payoffs. They can be, for example, consumption 
bundles, portfolios of assets or health states. Objects of choice are risky lotteries. A risky 
lottery ( )nppL ,...,1  is a probability distribution on X  i.e. it delivers outcome ix  with 
probability [ ]1,0∈ip , { }ni ,...,1∈ , and 11 =∑ =ni ip . A compound lottery ( ) 21 1 LL αα −+  
yields a risky lottery 1L  with probability [ ]1,0∈α  and a risky lottery 2L  with probability 
α−1 . The set of all risky lotteries is denoted by Λ . 
An individual (decision maker) does not have a preference relation on Λ. The 
primitive of choice is a function [ ]1,0:Pr →Λ×Λ , ( )21 ,Pr LL  represents the probability 
that an individual chooses lottery 1L  out of 1L  and 2L . For any two lotteries Λ∈21, LL , a 
choice probability ( )21 ,Pr LL  is clearly observable from a (relative) frequency with which 
an individual chooses 1L  when he or she is asked to choose repeatedly between 1L  and 2L .  
A deterministic preference relation can be easily converted into a choice probability. 
If an individual strictly prefers 1L  over 2L , then ( ) 1,Pr 21 =LL . If an individual strictly 
prefers 2L  over 1L , then ( ) 0,Pr 21 =LL . Finally, if an individual is exactly indifferent 
between 1L  and 2L , then ( ) 21,Pr 21 =LL . Thus, a deterministic binary preference relation 
on Λ , which is a starting building block of nearly all decision theories, can be considered 
as a special case of a more general framework where individual decisions are governed by 
choice probabilities. 
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III. Axioms 
Axiom 1 (Completeness) For any two lotteries Λ∈21, LL ,  ( ) ( ) 1,Pr,Pr 1221 =+ LLLL . 
Axiom 1 simply states that only two events are possible in a binary choice between 
1L  and 2L —either an individual chooses 1L  over 2L  or an individual chooses 2L  over 1L  
(but not both at the same time). Recall that the completeness axiom imposed on a binary 
preference relation states that for any two lotteries Λ∈21, LL  either 1L   is preferred over 2L  
or 2L  is preferred over 1L  or both. Axiom 1 can be extended by allowing for a “neutral” 
event when an individual does not care about a choice problem and delegates choice 
decision to an arbitrary third party e.g. a coin toss (but bears the consequences of the third 
party decision). However, empirical evidence suggests that such option, when available, is 
seldom used (Camerer, 1989) and it is not necessary for a theoretical analysis.  
Axiom 1 immediately implies that ( ) 21,Pr =LL  for any Λ∈L . 
Axiom 2 (Strong Stochastic Transitivity) For any three lotteries Λ∈321 ,, LLL  if 
( ) 21,Pr 21 ≥LL  and ( ) 21,Pr 32 ≥LL  then ( ) ( ) ( ){ }322131 ,Pr,,Prmax,Pr LLLLLL ≥ . 
Axiom 3 (Continuity) For any three lotteries Λ∈321 ,, LLL  the sets 
[ ] ( )( ){ }21,1Pr 1,0 321 ≥−+∈ LLL ααα  and [ ] ( )( ){ }21,1Pr 1,0 321 ≤−+∈ LLL ααα  are closed. 
Intuitively, continuity insures that a small change in the probability distribution over 
outcomes does not result in a significant change in the choice probabilities.  
Axiom 4 (Common Consequence Independence) For any four lotteries 
Λ∈4321 ,,, LLLL  and any probability [ ]1,0∈α : ( ) ( )( ) =−+−+ 3231 1,1Pr LLLL αααα  
( ) ( )( )4241 1,1Pr LLLL αααα −+−+= . 
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Axiom 4 states that binary choice probabilities are independent of the consequences 
that are common to both choice alternatives. In other words, if two lotteries yield identical 
chances of the same outcome (or, more generally, if two compound lotteries yield identical 
chances of the same risky lottery) this common consequence does not affect the probability 
that one of the lotteries is chosen over the other.  
Axiom 4 is weaker than condition ( ) ( ) ( )( )323121 1,1Pr,Pr LLLLLL αααα −+−+=  
for any three lotteries Λ∈321 ,, LLL  and any probability [ ]1,0∈α . The latter condition can 
be interpreted as a stochastic version of the independence axiom of expected utility theory. 
Axiom 5 (Interchangeability) For any three lotteries Λ∈321 ,, LLL  if 
( ) ( ) 21,Pr,Pr 1221 == LLLL , then ( ) ( )3231 ,Pr,Pr LLLL = . 
Axiom 5 states that if an individual is equally likely to choose either of the two 
lotteries in a direct binary choice, then these two lotteries can be interchanged in any other 
decision problem without affecting the choice probabilities. Intuitively, if an individual 
chooses between two lotteries at random then he or she does not mind which of the two 
lotteries is involved in another decision problem. For example, consider an individual who 
is completely indifferent between Chinese and Thai food. In this case, interchangeability 
would imply that the chances that this individual opts for a Chinese restaurant over an 
Indian restaurant are just as high as the chances that he or she chooses a Thai restaurant 
over an Indian restaurant.  
Axiom 5 holds trivially for a transitive binary preference relation.   
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IV. Stochastic Utility Theorem 
Theorem 1 (Stochastic Utility Theorem) Function [ ]1,0:Pr →Λ×Λ  satisfies 
Axioms 1-5 if and only if there exist an assignment of real numbers iu  to every outcome 
ix , { }ni ,...,1∈ , and there exist a non-decreasing function [ ]1,0: →Ψ R  such that for any 
two risky lotteries ( ) ( ) Λ∈nn qqLppL ,...,,,..., 1211 : ( ) ( )∑∑ == −Ψ= ni iini ii qupuLL 1121 ,Pr . 
Proof is presented in the Appendix. 
Function ( ).Ψ  has to satisfy a restriction ( ) ( )xx −Ψ−=Ψ 1  for every R∈x , which 
immediately implies that ( ) 210 =Ψ . If a vector { }nuuU ,...,1=  and function ( ).Ψ  represent 
choice probabilities then a vector baUU +=′  and a function ( ) ( )a.. Ψ=Ψ′  represent the 
same choice probabilities for any two real numbers a  and b , 0≠a . Vector { }nuuU ,...,1=  
can be regarded as a vector of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities that capture the 
“goodness” of outcomes { }nxx ,...,1 . Function ( ).Ψ  can be regarded as a sensitivity measure 
with respect to the relative advantage of one lottery over another. 
Several popular models of stochastic choice emerge from a general stochastic utility 
representation in Theorem 1 as special cases. For example, when function ( ).Ψ  is a 
cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with mean zero and constant 
standard deviation 0>σ , stochastic utility representation becomes the Fechner model of 
random errors (e.g. Fechner, 1860; Hey and Orme, 1994). When function ( ).Ψ  is a 
cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, i.e. ( ) ( )( )xx λ−+=Ψ exp11 , 
where 0>λ  is constant, stochastic utility representation becomes Luce choice model (e.g. 
Luce and Suppes, 1965; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996). Finally, if 
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function ( ).Ψ  is the step function (piecewise constant function) of the form ( ) px =Ψ  if 
0<x , ( ) 21=Ψ x  if 0=x  and ( ) px −=Ψ 1  if 0>x ,  where 0>p  is constant, stochastic 
utility representation becomes a tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994). 
Axiomatization of stochastic utility allows characterizing the above mentioned 
models in terms of the properties of individual choice probabilities that are observable from 
empirical data and that can be directly tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. In 
particular, axioms allow us to relate stochastic utility theory to the well known stylized 
empirical facts about individual choice behavior under risk. Unlike expected utility theory, 
stochastic utility theory is consistent with systematic violations of betweenness and a 
common ratio effect. However, subjective choice probabilities that admit stochastic utility 
representation cannot exhibit a common consequence effect. 
For two lotteries Λ∈21 , LL and [ ]1,0∈α  let event A  denote a choice of 1L  over 2L  
and a choice of ( ) 21 1 LL αα −+  over 1L  . Let event B  denote a choice of 2L  over 1L  and a 
choice of 1L  over ( ) 21 1 LL αα −+ . Systematic violations of betweenness are observed if A  
happens more frequently than B  or vice versa (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994). If binary 
choices are independent then ( )BA  is observed more frequently than ( )AB  when ( )21 ,Pr LL  
is greater (smaller) than ( )( )211 1,Pr LLL αα −+ . If choice probabilities on Λ×Λ  satisfy 
Axioms 2 and 4 then ( )21 ,Pr LL  is greater (smaller) than ( )( )211 1,Pr LLL αα −+  when 
( )( )211 1,Pr LLL αα −+  is greater (smaller) than one half. Thus, stochastic utility can exhibit 
a pattern known as systematic violations of betweenness (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2006). 
Let 3=n  and lotteries have monetary outcomes 0123 =>> xxx . A common ratio 
effect is observed when ( ) ( )4321 PrPr LLLL ff >  for lotteries ( )0,1,01L , ( )ppL ,0,12 − , 
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( )0,,13 θθ−L , ( )ppL θθ ,0,14 −  and probabilities ( )1,0, ∈θp  (e.g. Allais, 1953). Choice 
probabilities that have stochastic utility representation can exhibit a common ratio effect. If 
choice probabilities satisfy Axiom 4 then ( ) ( )( )12143 1,Pr,Pr LLLLL θθ −+= . When they 
additionally satisfy Axiom 2 then ( ) ( )( )12121 1,Pr,Pr LLLLL θθ −+≥  if 
( )( ) 211,Pr 121 ≥−+ LLL θθ . Thus, stochastic utility is consistent with a common ratio 
effect ( ) ( ) 21,Pr,Pr 4321 ≥≥ LLLL  but it cannot explain a common ratio effect 
( ) ( )4321 ,Pr21,Pr LLLL ≥≥  (e.g. Loomes, 2005).  
A common consequence effect is observed when ( ) ( )4321 ,Pr,Pr LLLL >  for 
lotteries ( )0,1,01L , ( )qpqpL ,1,2 −− , ( )0,,13 ppL − , ( )qqL ,0,14 −  and probabilities 
( )1,0, ∈qp , qp >  (e.g. Allais, 1953). Choice probabilities that admit stochastic utility 
representation cannot exhibit common consequence effect because Axiom 4 implies 
( ) ( )4321 ,Pr,Pr LLLL = . To accommodate a common consequence effect within stochastic 
utility framework Axiom 4 can be replaced with a stochastic analogue of one of the axioms 
of non-expected utility theories. For example, Axiom 4 can be weakened into Axiom 4a. 
Axiom 4a (Betweenness) For any Λ∈21 , LL and any [ ]1,0,,, ∈δγβα  such that 
δγβα −=− : ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )21212121 1,1Pr1,1Pr LLLLLLLL δδγγββαα −+−+=−+−+ . 
Function [ ]1,0:Pr →Λ×Λ  that satisfies Axioms 1-3, 4a and 5 can be represented 
by implicit stochastic utility ( ) ( ) ( )( )2121,Pr LULULL −Ψ=  for any Λ∈21 , LL , where 
R→Λ:U  is implicit expected utility of a lottery (e.g. Dekel, 1986). Thus, stochastic 
utility theorem can be extended to represent choice probabilities that do not necessarily 
exhibit common consequence independence.  
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V. Conclusion 
One of the robust findings from experimental research on repeated decision making 
is that individuals often make contradictory choices when they face the same binary choice 
problem within a short period of time. This evidence suggests that individuals do not 
possess a unique preference relation on the space of risky lotteries Λ . Either individuals 
have multiple preference relations on Λ  that can be represented by a random utility model 
(recently axiomatized by Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006) or individuals have a probability 
measure on Λ×Λ  that can be represented by stochastic utility model.  
Stochastic utility captures the observed randomness in binary choice probabilities. 
Thus, stochastic utility merely represents probabilistic choice behavior and it is not 
necessarily related to the risk associated with the choice alternatives. In fact, an individual 
can make probabilistic choices even over riskless choice alternatives (e.g. Debreu, 1958). It 
is also possible to interpret stochastic utility as a representation of a fuzzy preference 
relation (e.g. Zimmerman et al., 1984) on the set of risky lotteries Λ  . However, this paper 
refers to the primitives of choice as choice probabilities rather than fuzzy preferences to 
avoid confusion with a classical binary preference relation. 
This paper shows that choice probabilities admit a stochastic utility representation if 
and only if they are complete, strongly transitive, continuous, independent of common 
consequences and interchangeable. Axioms of stochastic utility are consistent with several 
choice patterns (such as systematic violations of betweenness and a common ratio effect) 
that contradict to the axioms of expected utility framework.  Special cases of stochastic 
utility representation include the Fechner model of random errors, Luce choice model and a 
tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994). 
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At least one axiom of stochastic utility—common consequence independence—has 
been extensively tested in controlled experiments and it is known to be frequently violated 
(e.g. the Allais paradox). However, interchangeability axiom is likely to be problematic too. 
When lottery outcomes are monetary, choice among outcomes for certain is deterministic. 
In fact, when one lottery transparently first-order stochastically dominates the other lottery, 
subjects seldom choose a dominated alternative (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1998). Thus, 
reality appears to be somewhere between a deterministic decision theory derived from a 
preference relation and a stochastic decision theory derived from choice probabilities.  
Apparently, an individual possesses a preference relation on a non-empty subset of 
Λ  (that includes, for example, the set of lottery outcomes) and a probability measure on 
Λ×Λ . The preference relation allows to make cognitively undemanding decisions, e.g. 
when one alternative clearly dominates the other alternative, and the probability measure 
governs the remaining decisions. Such a hybrid model of decision making can be 
characterized within the framework of choice probabilities introduced in this paper because 
a deterministic preference relation can be easily translated into choice probabilities. A 
restriction on the interchangeability axiom so that it holds only when lotteries do not 
transparently dominate each other appears to be a necessary first step for extending 
stochastic utility theorem along these lines.  
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Appendix 
Before we prove Theorem 1, it is convenient to prove the following Lemma. 
Lemma A1 If Axioms 1-5 hold then for any Λ∈10 , LL  such that ( ) 21,Pr 01 ≥LL  
and any [ ]1,0∈α  : ( ) 21,Pr 1 ≥αLL  and ( ) 21,Pr 0 ≤αLL , where ( ) 01 1 LLL ααα −+≡ .  
Proof by contradiction. Suppose there exist [ ]1,0∈α  such that ( ) 21,Pr 0 >αLL . We 
will construct now a sequence { }∞=1nna  such that α=∞→ nn alim  and ( ) 21,Pr 0 =naLL  for every 
N∈n . Continuity axiom implies that the sets [ ] ( )( ){ }21,1Pr 1,0 01 ≥−+∈ LLL αβββ  and 
[ ] ( )( ){ }21,1Pr 1,0 01 ≤−+∈ LLL αβββ  are closed. Completeness axiom guarantees that 
every [ ]1,0∈β  belongs to at least one of these two sets. Since both sets are nonempty 
( 1=β  belongs to the first set and 0=β  belongs to the second set), there is at least one β~  
that belongs to both sets. Notice that this β~  cannot be zero because ( ) 21,Pr 0 >αLL . If 
there is ( ]1,0~∈β  such that ( )( ) 21,~1~Pr 01 =−+ LLL αββ , this is equivalent to a statement 
that there is ( ]1,αγ ∈  such that ( ) ( ) 21,Pr,Pr 00 == γγ LLLL . This is the first element of our 
sequence γ=1a . Notice that ( ) ( )220 ,Pr,Pr γγγ LLLL =  due to interchangeability and 
( ) ( ) ( )022222 ,Pr,Pr,Pr LLLLLL γγγγγγγ == −−  due to common consequence independence. 
Hence, ( ) ( ) 21,Pr,Pr 0220 == LLLL γγ  and we have a second element of our sequence 
22 γ=a . If 2γα =  then we immediately have contradiction to our initial assumption that 
( ) 21,Pr 0 >αLL . If 2γα <  then the third element of our sequence is 43 γ=a . 
( ) 21,Pr 40 =γLL  because ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0444424240 ,Pr,Pr,Pr,Pr LLLLLLLL γγγγγγγγ === −−  
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with the first (second) equality due to interchangeability (common consequence 
independence). If 2γα >  then the third element of our sequence is 433 γ=a . 
( ) 21,Pr 430 =γLL  because ( ) ( ) ( ) 21,Pr,Pr,Pr 43434343430 === −− γγγγγγγ LLLLLL . By 
continuing in this fashion ad infinitum, we construct sequence { }∞=1nna  that is recursively 
defined by 11 2
−
− += nnn aa γ  if 1−> naα  and 11 2 −− −= nnn aa γ  if 1−< naα , N∈n . 
Continuity implies that the sets [ ] ( ){ }21,Pr 1,0 0 ≥∈ LLδδ  and [ ] ( ){ }21,Pr 1,0 0 ≤∈ LLδδ  
are closed. Each element of the sequence { }∞=1nna  belongs to both of these sets. Hence, the 
limit of the sequence α=∞→ nn alim  also belongs to both of these sets. This implies that 
( ) ( ) 21,Pr,Pr 00 == αα LLLL . However, this contradicts to our initial assumption that 
( ) 21,Pr 0 >αLL . We arrive at a similar contradiction if we assume that there exist [ ]1,0∈α  
such that ( ) 21,Pr 1 <αLL . This completes the proof of Lemma A1. 
Proof of Theorem 1 
It is straightforward to verify that if function [ ]1,0:Pr →Λ×Λ  has a stochastic 
utility representation then it satisfies all Axioms 1-5. We will now prove that if function 
[ ]1,0:Pr →Λ×Λ  satisfies Axioms 1-5 then it has a stochastic utility representation.  
Let iD  denote a degenerate lottery that delivers outcome Xxi ∈  with probability 
one, { }ni ,...,1∈ . Since the set of possible outcomes X  is finite, completeness and strong 
stochastic transitivity imply that outcomes can be ordered so that ( ) 21,Pr ≥ji DD  if ji ≥ , 
for any { }nji ,...,1, ∈ . Next we prove that ( ) 21,Pr ≥LDn  and ( ) 21,Pr 1 ≤LD  for any 
lottery ( )nppL ,...,1 . Proof by mathematical induction. When 2=n , the statement follows 
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immediately from Lemma A1 by setting 10 DL = , 21 DL =  and 2p=α . Let us now assume 
that the statement holds for any 1−≤ kn  and let us prove that it also holds for kn = . 
Notice that an arbitrary lottery ( )kppL ,...,1  can be written as a compound lottery 
( )LpDp kkk ′−+ 1 , where lottery L′  is ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−
− 0,
1
,...,
1
11
k
k
k p
p
p
p . Since ( ) 21,Pr 1 ≥′− LDk  due 
to the assumption of mathematical induction and ( ) 21,Pr 1 ≥−kk DD  due to the ordering of 
outcomes, strong stochastic transitivity implies that ( ) 21,Pr ≥′LDk . Lemma A1 then 
implies that  ( )( ) 211,Pr ≥′−+ LpDpD kkkk  for any [ ]1,0∈kp . Similarly, it is possible to 
show that ( ) 21,Pr 1 ≤LD  for any lottery ( )kppL ,...,1  if the latter is written as a compound 
lottery ( )LpDp ′′−+ 111 1 , where lottery L ′′  is ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−− 11
2
1
,...,
1
,0
p
p
p
p k . Therefore, degenerate 
lotteries nD  and 1D  are correspondingly “the best” and “the worst” lottery in Λ  i.e. 
( ) 21,Pr ≥LDn  and ( ) 21,Pr 1 ≤LD  for any Λ∈L . 
We will first consider the case when ( ) 21,Pr 1 =DDn . If ( ) 21,Pr 1 =nDD  and 
( ) 21,Pr ≥LDn  for any Λ∈L  (by definition of nD ) strong stochastic transitivity implies 
that ( ) 21,Pr 1 ≥LD . Since ( ) 21,Pr 1 ≤LD  by definition of 1D , it must be the case that 
( ) 21,Pr 1 =LD  for any Λ∈L . If ( ) 21,Pr 11 ≥DL  and ( ) 21,Pr 21 =LD  for any Λ∈21, LL , 
strong stochastic transitivity implies that ( ) 21,Pr 21 ≥LL . If ( ) 21,Pr 21 ≥LL  and 
( ) 21,Pr 12 ≥LL  it must be the case that ( ) 21,Pr 21 =LL  for any Λ∈21, LL  and these 
degenerate choice probabilities can be represented by assignment 0=iu , { }ni ,...,1∈ , and 
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( ) 210 =Ψ . Therefore, from this point onwards only the case when ( ) 21,Pr 1 >DDn  is 
considered. 
Continuity axiom implies that the sets [ ] ( )( ){ }21,1Pr 1,0 1 ≥−+∈ LDDn ααα  and 
[ ] ( )( ){ }21,1Pr 1,0 1 ≤−+∈ LDDn ααα  are closed for any Λ∈L . Completeness axiom 
guarantees that every [ ]1,0∈α  belongs to at least one of these two sets. Since both sets are 
nonempty ( 1=α  belongs to the first set and 0=α  belongs to the second set), there is at 
least one α  that belongs to both sets. Thus, for any Λ∈L  there exist [ ]1,0∈Lα  such that 
( )( ) 21,1Pr 1 =−+ LDD LnL αα . We will now prove that Lα  is unique for every Λ∈L . 
Suppose there is LL αα ≠′  such that ( )( ) 21,1Pr 1 =′−+′ LDD LnL αα . Assume 
without a loss of generality that LL αα >′  and let LL ααδ −′= . If 
( )( ) 21,1Pr 1 =′−+′ LDD LnL αα  and ( )( ) 211,Pr 1 =−+ DDL LnL αα  then 
( ) ( )( ) 211,1Pr 11 =−+′−+′ DDDD LnLLnL αααα  by strong stochastic transitivity. 
Common consequence independence implies that ( ) ( )( ) =−+′−+′ 11 1,1Pr DDDD LnLLnL αααα  
( )( ) 21,1Pr 11 =−+= DDDn δδ . If ( )( ) 21,1Pr 11 =−+ DDDn δδ  then  
( ) ( )( ) 211,212Pr 11 =−+−+ DDDD nn δδδδ  by common consequence independence 
and ( )( ) 21,212Pr 11 =−+ DDD n δδ  by strong stochastic transitivity. Applying this 
reasoning { }δα Lk ′= int  times we obtain that ( )( ) 21,1Pr 11 =−+ DDkDk n δδ . 
By a similar pattern, common consequence independence implies that 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 211,Pr1,1Pr 111 =+−=−+′−+′ DDDDDDD nnLnLLnL δδαααα . If 
( )( ) 211,Pr 1 =+− DDD nn δδ  then ( ) ( )( ) 21221,1Pr 11 =+−+− DDDD nn δδδδ  by common 
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consequence independence and ( )( ) 21221,Pr 1 =+− DDD nn δδ  by strong stochastic 
transitivity. Applying this reasoning ( ){ }δα Lm −= 1int  times we obtain that 
( )( ) 211,Pr 1 =+− DmDmD nn δδ . 
We prove next that ( ) ( )( ) 211,1Pr 11 =−+−+ DDDD nn ννηη  for all [ ]LL αανη ′∈ ,, . 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 21,1Pr1,1Pr 1111 ≥+−+−=−+−+ DDDDDDD LnLLnLn αηαηααηη  with 
equality due to common consequence independence and inequality due to definition of 1D . 
Similarly, ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 21,1Pr1,1Pr 1111 ≥+′−+−′=−+′−+′ DDDDDDD LnLnLnL ηαηαηηαα . 
Strong stochastic transitivity then implies ( ) ( )( ) ≥=−+′−+′ 211,1Pr 11 DDDD LnLLnL αααα  
( ) ( )( )11 1,1Pr DDDD LnLn ααηη −+−+≥ . Therefore it must be the case that 
( ) ( )( ) 211,1Pr 11 =−+−+ DDDD LnLn ααηη  for any [ ]LL ααη ′∈ , . If 
( ) ( )( ) 211,1Pr 11 =−+−+ DDDD LnLn ααηη  and ( ) ( )( ) 211,1Pr 11 =−+−+ DDDD LnLn αανν  
strong stochastic transitivity then implies that ( ) ( )( ) 211,1Pr 11 =−+−+ DDDD nn ννηη  for 
any [ ]LL αανη ′∈ ,,  
Since [ ]LLk ααδ ′∈ ,  and [ ]LLm ααδ ′∈− ,1  by our choice of integers k  and m  it 
follows that ( ) ( )( ) 211,1Pr 11 =−++− DkDkDmDm nn δδδδ . Strong stochastic transitivity 
then implies ( )( ) 211,Pr 1 =−+ DkDkD nn δδ  and ( ) 21,Pr 1 =DDn . However, we already 
considered this case at the beginning of this proof. Therefore it must be the case that 
LL αα =′ . In other words, for any Λ∈L  there exist unique [ ]1,0∈Lα  such that 
( )( ) 21,1Pr 1 =−+ LDD LnL αα . 
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Interchangeability implies ( ) ( ) ( )( )1121 2211 1,1Pr,Pr DDDDLL LnLLnL αααα −+−+=  
for any two risky lotteries Λ∈21 , LL . If 21 LL αα >  then a common consequence 
independence implies ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
212121 1121
,1Pr,Pr LLLLnLL DDDLL αααααα −Ψ≡+−+−= . 
If 
21 LL
αα <  then a common consequence independence implies 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1121 1212 1,Pr,Pr DDDLL LLnLL αααα +−+−=  and completeness additionally implies 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
21121212
1,1Pr1,Pr 1121 LLLLLLnLL DDDLL αααααααα −Ψ≡−Ψ−=+−+−−= . 
Function ( ).Ψ  is defined as ( ) ( )( ) [ ]( )( ) [ ]⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−∈++−−
∈−+
≡Ψ
.0,1,,1Pr1
1,0,,1Pr
11
11
λλλ
λλλ
λ
DDD
DDD
n
n
 
Notice that function ( ).Ψ  is non-decreasing. For any [ ]1,0, ∈μλ  such that μλ >  
common consequence independence implies ( ) ( )( ) =−+−+ 11 1,1Pr DDDD nn μμλλ  
( ) ( )( ) 21,1Pr 11 ≥+−+−= DDDn μλμλ  with the last inequality due to definition of 1D . 
Since ( ) ( )( ) 211,1Pr 11 ≥−+−+ DDDD nn μμλλ  and ( )( ) 21,1Pr 11 ≥−+ DDDn μμ  (again by 
definition of 1D ), strong stochastic transitivity implies 
( )( ) ( )( )1111 ,1Pr,1Pr DDDDDD nn μμλλ −+≥−+ . Therefore, ( ) ( )μλ Ψ≥Ψ  for any 
[ ]1,0, ∈μλ  such that μλ > . 
Interchangeability axiom implies that for any [ ]1,0∈β  and any three lotteries 
Λ∈321 ,, LLL  a choice probability ( )( )321 ,1Pr LLL ββ −+  can be rewritten as 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )311 ,111Pr 2211 LDDDD LnLLnL ααβααβ −+−+−+ . After rearranging terms we 
obtain ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( ) =⋅−−−+⋅−+=−+ 31321 ,111Pr,1Pr 2121 LDDLLL LLnLL αββααββαββ  
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( )( )
321
1 LLL ααββα −−+Ψ= . Thus, assignment of numbers Lα  is linear in probabilities i.e. 
( ) ( ) 2121 11 LLLL αββαα ββ −+=−+ .  
To summarize, for every outcome ix , { }ni ,...,1∈ , we can find a number [ ]1,0∈iu  
such that ( )( ) 21,1Pr 1 =−+ iini DDuDu . For any two risky lotteries 
( ) ( ) Λ∈nn qqLppL ,...,,,..., 1211   a choice probability ( )21 ,Pr LL  can be then written as 
( ) ( )∑∑ == −Ψ= ni iini ii qupuLL 1121 ,Pr . Q.E.D. 
